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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900497-CA
Priority No. 2

CHANNAN S. SINGH,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant CHANNAN S. SINGH relies on his opening
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. Appellant
replies to the State's brief as follows.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The plain language of the involved authority requires a
"writing," which was (purportedly) issued by the government.

The

involved police officers testified that the papers seized from
Mr. Singh were invalid and could not be used.

The papers,

themselves, further evidenced their facial invalidity and did not
satisfy the requisite elements of the forgery statute.
Failure to adhere to the statutory requirements cannot be
circumvented by the alleged intent of the Model Penal Code.

The

State has not shown that the Utah legislature considered or adopted
the "MPC," and even it the MPC was adopted, the MPC would still
require an apparently complete writing.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A "WRITING,"
fPURPORTEDLY) ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
In its brief, the State contends that Mr. Singh "provides
no authority or argument indicating that section 76-6-501 codifies
the common law as to 'legal efficacy.'"

Appellee's brief at 9.

The

State misreads Mr. Singh's brief wherein his statutory argument1
stated, inter alia:
Utah's Code may not explicitly list the common law
element of "legal efficacy" in its forgery statute,
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501, but the forgery charges
nonetheless require the "writing" to symbolize a right
or privilege issued by the government. Id. No
privilege attaches to an invalid license.
Appellant's opening brief at 9.
A statutory analysis is the appropriate starting point for
this appeal.

See Appellant's opening brief, Point I.

"A

fundamental principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous
language in the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to

1

The caselaw authority cited by Appellant, State v.
Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa 1988), is also applicable. The State's
reading of Ortega, that "[t]he case clearly stands for the
proposition that a public document must purport to have legal
efficacy in order to constitute a forgery . . . [and that] the
documents at issue were completely blank driver's license forms,
obviously lacking even the semblance of apparent legal
efficacy, . . . " Appellee's brief at 9, is directly supportive of
Appellant's arguments. See Appellant's opening brief at 8 n.3 and
accompanying text.
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express language of the applicable authorities reveals that a forged
governmental writing would not include a permit, inadequately
completed and unrepresentative of a privilege, resort to the forgery
statute's legislative history is unnecessary.
Second, the State cites no authority to support its
contention that when Utah adopted the wording of the New Hampshire
forgery statute, it also adopted "whole-cloth" the intent of the
Model Penal Code commentaries, at least in terms of the forgery
section.

See Appellee's brief at 11. Unstated by the State is

whether the Utah or New Hampshire legislature even considered, let
alone adopted, the intent of the MPC during the drafting of their
respective forgery provisions.

Indeed, the State provides no

explanation of why the Utah legislature made minor changes in the
wording of its statute and the significance of those changes, if
any, assuming that Utah did in fact intend to adopt both the
language and the commentaries from the MPC section in their
entirety.

The State's unsupported assumptions should not be

considered on appeal.

See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah

1986) (per curiam).
Third, even if the State's reliance on the Model Penal Code
is tenable, the MPC's emphasis on the actor's mental state still
does not negate the existence of the "facially complete" writing
requirement.

See Appellant's opening brief at 8 n.3.

The "writing"

requirement, a key element of the alleged offense, Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-501(2), cannot be considered "non-material."
brief at 16.
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In its brief, the State argues that additional steps ot
completion may not be reguired for a forgery charge to exist
Appellee's brief at 9. Its argument, however, is taken out of
context. The general rule is that "[t]here can be no forgery of an
instrument which is void on its face, as in the case of a
meaningless paper, [or] an instrument so incomplete as obviously to
be incapable of enforcement, . . ." 4 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal
Law § 512 (14th ed• 1981) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
The State's relied upon exception, inapplicable here,
involves an instrument which is already complete enough to evidence
its apparent legal efficacy. See Hall v. State, 31 Ala. App. 455,
18 So.2d 572 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944) ("had the forged bond been void
without legal efficacy on its face, the demurrers would have been
well taken, but . . . the bail bond was as legally efficacious
unsigned by the defendant as signed,
, " ) ; Clay v. State, 57 Ala.
App. 630, 330 So.2d 453 (Ala. Crim. App, 1975) (the instrument was
already "in proper form" and it "was nor void because the account
number on the instrument was a b s e n t " ) .

"writing," a middleman must first complete the blank spaces before
passing it off as authentic to a third party.
opening brief at 10 n.4 and accompanying text.

See Appellant's
No writing or

forgery existed.
The State's heavy reliance on the "strong suggestions" of
the MPC overlooked the unproven statutory elements of a "writing,"
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2), which was (purportedly) issued by the
"government."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(3)(a).

Despite the State's

reference to decisions "whereby conceivably non-culpable conduct was
found to be within the statute's purview," Appellee's brief at 13,
courts have consistently recognized that perceptions of "guilt" are
an inadequate substitute for proving each element of the offense.
See Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986) ("in a
criminal prosecution every element of the offense must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt"); cf. State v. Sampson. 156
Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 8 n.8 (Utah App. 1991) (opinion on rehearing) ("we
are unwilling to sidestep important constitutional safeguards to
assuage the frustrations that inhere in retrying a defendant clearly
guilty of such a heinous crime").
POINT II
THE OFFICERS TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE FACIALLY VOID PERMITS
PROVIDED THE JURY WITH A RATIONAL BASIS FOR ACQUITTAL
(Reply to Point II-IV of Appellee's Brief)
The State contends, "[o]ther than eliciting from the
State's witnesses [testimony] that the permits were void as sold to
police detectives, defendant offered no evidence at all to refute

- 6

the State's case."

Appellee's brief at 19 (emphasis added).

This

key segment of cross-examination, however, cannot be overlooked.
(R 32); (T 68, 79).
Obtaining this acknowledgement of "voidness" provided the
jury with a rational basis for acquitting Mr. Singh of forgery.
also State's Exhibits 1-3 (the permits are facially invalid).

See
"[I]n

determining whether a rational jury could acquit on the greater
charge and find guilt on the lesser charge, the court must view the
evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the defendant."

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449,

451 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted); State v.
Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah 1984) (if the jury could have
accepted the defendant's testimony concerning a lesser included
offense, "however unlikely that might have been," it was error to
refuse the instruction).

For the reasons stated previously in his

opening brief, Mr. Singh submits that the trial court erred in
refusing to charge the jury with the lesser included offenses.3

See

Appellant's opening brief, Point II.
Mr. Singh also continues to maintain, as did the trial
court below, that the State "could have charged [him] under [Utah

3

The State requests that this Court to enter a "judgment
of conviction for attempted forgery[,]" Appellee's brief at 22-23, a
lesser included offense of the alleged offense. The statutory
authority cited by the State, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5), permits
such an entry only "if such relief is sought by the defendant."
Id. In contrast to the State's request, Mr. Singh seeks a reversal
"because there was insufficient evidence to support the forgery
charges or [a reversal] and remand for a new trial with the addition
of his proposed jury instructions." Appellant's opening brief at 20.
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Code Ann. § 41-2-133."

(T 18); see Appellant's opening brief at 16,

19 n.7 and accompanying text.

The State's reference to a "transfer"

presupposes a transfer of a sufficiently completed writing issued by
the government.

Appellee's brief at 21-22.

The prohibited use of a

license statute would not necessarily require a transfer and was
more specifically tailored for th€> involved conduct than the forgery
statute.

See Appellant's opening brief at 19 n.7.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Channan Singh
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the case
remanded to the trial court for a new trial or dismissal.

See

Appellant's reply brief at 7 n.3.
SUBMITTED this 32-

day of April, 1990.

UiP^
Attorney for, De^fidant/Appellant

RONALD S.^FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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